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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,1 the Supreme Court is 
obliged to opine once again on the constitutionality of affirmative 
action in higher education. While the potential outcome of this case is 
nearly impossible to predict, insight into how the Court might decide 
Fisher can be found in an unlikely place. Twenty years ago, the Court 
decided a case that in almost every way has nothing to do with 
affirmative action, but in one important respect is conveniently 
illustrative of the path the Court might choose to take. 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 the Court chose to resolve the 
fate of a constitutionally embattled, politically charged principle: that 
the Constitution protects the right to have an abortion. In a now-
famous opinion, the Court averted the extreme path of disavowing 
the abortion right and opted instead for a more moderate approach—
it reaffirmed the core of the right,3 but significantly altered the 
doctrinal rules insulating it.4 This term, the Court faces a similar task, 
and will likely take a similar path. In Fisher, the Court is confronted 
 
 2014 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. I thank Professor Joseph Blocher for his 
guidance and support and for teaching me most of what I know about constitutional law. I also 
thank Andrew Hand, Aaron Johnson, Matt Waldrop, Patrick Jamieson, Elisa Sielski, and Sitara 
Witanachchi for their helpful comments and edits. 
 1.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012). Justice Kagan 
is recused from this case, and a four-to-four split at the Supreme Court would result in the lower 
court opinion being affirmed. Because the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of UT on all relevant 
issues, any decision reversing any of the Fifth Circuit’s holding will require at least five votes. 
 2.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 3.  See id. at 846 (reaffirming “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade” that the Constitution 
protects a woman’s right to have an abortion). 
 4.  See, e.g., id. at 873 (rejecting the trimester framework, which the Court endorsed in 
Roe, but which was not “part of the essential holding of Roe”). 
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with a case that could potentially spell the end of affirmative action in 
higher education. As it did in Casey, the Court seems likely to sidestep 
the extreme route, this time by reaffirming the constitutional validity 
of affirmative action, while recalibrating, and making more rigorous, 
the rules by which race-conscious admissions policies must abide. 
The specific question in Fisher is whether the University of Texas 
at Austin’s (UT) use of race as a factor in admissions is 
constitutionally permissible.5 UT modeled its admissions policy after 
that of the University of Michigan Law School, which the Court 
approved nearly a decade ago in Grutter v. Bollinger.6 Because Grutter 
left much to be desired by way of a workable analytical framework,7 
Fisher is likely to focus just as much on clarifying (or “gutting”8) 
Grutter as on using it as a basis of decision. Accordingly, this 
commentary focuses on how the Court could use this case to rework 
Grutter, and on the potential impact of a Grutter makeover on UT’s 
use of race in admissions. In the end, just as abortion survived Casey, 
affirmative action in higher education probably will survive Fisher—
at least in theory.9 The Court is likely to uphold Grutter’s central 
teaching—that the Constitution permits narrowly tailored affirmative 
action policies—while striking down UT’s idiosyncratic use of race. 
Doing so will require a nuanced analysis, to say the least. 
 
 5.  Brief for the Petitioner at i, Fisher, No. 11-345 (U.S. Sept. 19, 2011). 
 6.  539 U.S. 306 (2003); see infra, notes 59–77 and accompanying text (discussing Grutter). 
 7.  See Libby Huskey, Note, Constitutional Law—Affirmative Action in Higher 
Education—Strict in Theory, Intermediate in Fact? Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), 4 
WYO. L. REV. 439, 473–76 (2004) (arguing that the Grutter decision would have been less murky 
if the Court had applied intermediate scrutiny); Mark T. Terrell, Bucking Grutter: Why Critical 
Mass Should Be Thrown Off the Affirmative Action Horse, 16 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 233, 234 
(2011) (arguing that Grutter’s “critical mass is too illusory to be a useful doctrinal tool”). See 
generally Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas: 
An Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. REV. 
L. & POL. 437 (2011) (criticizing Grutter). 
 8.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 81, Fisher, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012) 
(Sotomayor, J.) (“So you don’t want to overrule Grutter, you just want to gut it.”). 
 9.  See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Argument recap: Will Grutter be reshaped?, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Oct. 10, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=153589 (noting that “[a]ffirmative 
action is alive” but that Grutter “may have to be reshaped in order to survive”); Jeffrey Toobin, 
At the Supreme Court, A Timid Defense, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 11, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/10/affirmative-action-supreme-
court.html (concluding that even though affirmative action is in a “perilous state,” it will 
probably “survive in some form or another”). 
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner Abigail Fisher, a white Texas resident, was denied 
undergraduate admission to UT in 2008.10 She then filed suit, alleging 
that UT’s use of race as a factor in admissions violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 
A. History of UT’s Admissions Policies 
Until 1996, UT made admissions decisions using two metrics: the 
“Academic Index” (AI) and the applicant’s race.12 The AI, which is 
still employed today, is a composite score based on the applicant’s 
high school class rank, standardized test scores, and the rigor of the 
applicant’s high school curriculum.13 Between 1989 and 1995, black 
and Hispanic enrollment hovered around twenty percent under this 
policy.14 
In 1997, UT altered its admissions policy to comply with 
Hopwood v. Texas,15 a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, which invalidated the use of race in admissions at UT’s 
law school and held that diversity in higher education was not a 
compelling government interest.16 Consequently, UT replaced the race 
factor with the “Personal Achievement Index” (PAI), which was (and 
still is) used with the AI “to identify and reward students whose merit 
as applicants was not adequately reflected by their class rank and test 
scores.”17 The PAI was designed to increase minority enrollment by 
accounting for factors that could serve as proxies for race.18 The PAI is 
based on three scores: one for each of two essays and a separate 
 
 10.  Another applicant, former co-plaintiff Rachel Michalewicz, is no longer party to this 
case. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at ii. 
 11.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.”). 
 12.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Tex. 2009), 
aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 13.  Id. at 596. 
 14.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 631 F.3d 213, 222 n.47 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“Minority enrollment was fairly consistent from 1989 until 1993, with some slight decreases in 
1994 and 1995.” (citations omitted)), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-
3345). During this time race “was often a controlling factor in admission.” See id. at 223. 
 15.  78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 16.  Id. at 944–48. 
 17.  Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 591. 
 18.  See id. at 591–92 (explaining that factors such as “socio-economic status of the 
student’s family, languages other than English spoken at home, and whether the student lives in 
a single-parent household” disproportionately affect minority candidates). 
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“personal achievement score.”19 The personal achievement score is 
based on several “soft” factors, such as leadership experience, awards 
and honors, work experience, community circumstances, and a 
number of “special circumstances.”20 The special circumstances 
element includes socioeconomic status, family status, and 
standardized test scores compared to the average in the applicant’s 
high school.21 As a result of substituting the PAI for race, combined 
black and Hispanic enrollment dropped from 18.6% in 1996 to 15.3% 
in 1997.22 
Later that year, in its own response to Hopwood, the Texas 
legislature passed what became known as the Top Ten Percent Law,23 
under which all Texas seniors graduating in the top ten percent of 
their high school class are guaranteed admission to UT.24 Because 
Texas high schools remain highly segregated, the Top Ten Percent 
Law succeeded at increasing minority enrollment.25 By 2004—the last 
year before UT implemented its current policy—black and Hispanic 
enrollment reached 21.4%,26 returning UT to pre-Hopwood diversity 
levels without the explicit use of racial preferences. Then, in 2003, in 
response to the Supreme Court decision in Grutter,27 UT decided to 
reintroduce race as a minor factor in admissions.28 
 
 19.  Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 227–28. 
 20.  Id. The applicant’s race became a “special circumstance” in 2003. See infra note 34 and 
accompanying text. 
 21.  Id. UT also attempted to increase minority enrollment with targeted scholarship 
programs, focused outreach in underrepresented areas, and additional recruiting at 
underperforming schools. Id. at 592. 
 22.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 3–4; see also Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 224 
(expressing the change in total-number terms). 
 23.  See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 51.803 (West 2012) (requiring that public universities admit 
in-state students that graduate in the top ten percent of their high school class); accord Fisher II, 
631 F.3d at 224 (“The Top Ten Percent Law did not by its terms admit students on the basis of 
race, but underrepresented minorities were its announced target and their admission a large, if 
not primary, purpose.”). 
 24.  TEX. EDUC. CODE at § 51.803(a). 
 25.  See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 224 (“[T]he Top Ten Percent Law [increased] minority 
enrollment . . . .”). 
 26.  Id. at 223. 
 27.  See infra notes 59–77 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s decision in 
Grutter). 
 28.  See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 224 (discussing studies that were used in UT’s proposal to 
reintroduce race as an admissions factor). 
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B. Race as a Factor in UT’s Current Policy 
UT sought to model its current admissions policy after the one 
approved in Grutter.29 Applicants are now divided into three pools: (1) 
Texas residents, (2) domestic non-Texas residents, and (3) 
international students.30 Applicants compete only against other 
applicants in their respective pool.31 Texas residents are further 
divided into two subgroups: (a) those in the top ten percent of their 
high school class and (b) those outside the top ten percent.32 Non-top 
ten percent Texas residents, such as Abigail Fisher, are evaluated on 
the basis of their AI and PAI scores.33 
Unlike in UT’s previous policy, race is now a special circumstance 
that can be a plus factor in an applicant’s personal achievement score, 
which remains part of the PAI. None of the personal achievement 
score factors, including race, is given a numerical value, nor is any one 
factor dispositive to the admission decision.34 Race “can positively 
impact applicants of all races, including Caucasian[s], or it may have 
no impact whatsoever.”35 
Some applicants are accepted based on their AI score alone, but 
no applicant is denied solely on that basis.36 The AI and PAI scores of 
all non-top ten percent applicants are plotted on a grid, one on each 
axis. A staircase-shaped cutoff line is drawn, and all applicants in the 
included cells are admitted.37 Because race is considered only as part 
of the PAI score, it has no direct bearing on where the cutoff line is 
drawn. For purposes of admission to UT, the AI and PAI scores are 
relevant only for non-top ten percent applicants; but admission to 
particular majors is still determined by the AI and PAI scores, making 
 
 29.  See id. (recognizing that UT had “one eye on Grutter” when developing its current 
race-conscious admissions policy); id. at 247 (noting that the UT policy is “in some respects 
superior” to the Grutter plan). 
 30.  Id. at 227. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See id. at 228–29 (explaining that race is only one of many factors used in the context 
of a holistic review). 
 35.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (W.D. Tex. 2009), 
aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 36.  Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 227 (“If an application is presumptively denied [due to a low AI 
score], senior admission staff review the file [before making a final admissions decision].”). 
 37.  The position of the cutoff line varies from major to major. Id. at 229. “Relatively 
rarely,” after a review of the entire file, UT admits applicants whose scores fall below the 
official cutoff. See Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 599. 
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race, to some extent, a factor for everyone.38 
In stark contrast to UT’s pre-Hopwood use of race—where it was 
“often a controlling factor”—race is now merely “a factor of a factor 
of a factor of a factor.”39 Thus, the number of applicants for which race 
is decisive is arguably negligible.40 An applicant with the highest 
possible personal achievement score will still be denied admission, for 
example, if her AI and essay scores are too low.41 
UT does not monitor the racial makeup of the class during the 
admissions cycle, and it does not set numerical targets for minority 
enrollment.42 UT reviews its current policy “formally” every five years 
and “informally” every year, in order “to assess whether consideration 
of an applicant’s race [continues to be] necessary in order to create a 
diverse student body.”43 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Analytical Framework 
Government-sponsored44 affirmative action plans are subject to 
strict scrutiny, the most exacting standard of judicial review.45 Strict 
scrutiny mandates that racial classifications be narrowly tailored to 
 
 38.  Top Ten Percent Law applicants are guaranteed admission only to the University, not 
to the program or school of their choice. If these applicants do not receive admission to their 
first choice program, they compete for admission on the basis of their AI and PAI scores. “Top 
ten percent applicants not admitted to either their first- or second-choice program are 
automatically admitted as Liberal Arts Undeclared majors.” Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 229; see also 
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 8 (“[R]ace is a factor in admission, placement, or both 
for every in-state undergraduate applicant.”). 
 39.  See Brief for the Respondent at 13, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. 
Sept. 19, 2011) (quoting Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 608). 
 40.  See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 10 (arguing that race has affected 0.5% of 
the student body as a whole). But see Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 14 
(“[A]lthough petitioner claims that the consideration of race in holistic admissions has had an 
‘infinitesimal’ impact on diversity at UT, the record shows otherwise.”). 
 41.  Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 228–29 (citing Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 608). 
 42.  Id. at 230. 
 43.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 8 (citations omitted). 
 44.  Because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state-sponsored action, the entity 
doing the discriminating must be either a state actor or a private actor acting with the 
imprimatur of the state. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) 
(holding that the injury “did not constitute state action and hence was not subject to judicial 
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 45.  E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 
(2007) (reaffirming that affirmative action plans in education are reviewed under strict 
scrutiny); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
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achieve a compelling government interest,46 regardless of the race of 
the person advantaged or disadvantaged by the plan.47 The Court has 
held that universities can have a compelling interest in creating a 
diverse student body48 (the interest UT invokes here), but strict 
scrutiny requires that universities traverse a constitutionally narrow 
path in pursuit of that interest.49 This section describes that path and 
explains the cases that shaped it. 
B. Regents of University of California v. Bakke 
The Supreme Court first addressed affirmative action in higher 
education in Regents of University of California v. Bakke.50 The 
petitioner, a white medical school applicant, challenged the 
constitutionality of the University of California at Davis Medical 
School’s race-conscious admissions policy, which set aside sixteen slots 
(out of a class of 100) for minority students.51 The Court produced six 
opinions, none of which was joined by a majority of the Justices. 
Justice Powell, writing for himself, concluded that the set-aside was 
unconstitutional, but that race could be used as one factor in 
admissions decisions, so long as it was considered in the context of an 
individualized review process.52 Because the rigid sixteen-person 
quota did not allow for this sort of holistic review, Justice Powell 
provided a fifth vote to strike it down, and his opinion came to be 
regarded as controlling.53 
 
 46.  E.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005). 
 47.  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 525–26 (1980) (“The guarantee of equal protection 
is ‘universal in [its] application, to all persons . . . without regard to any differences of race, 
color, or of nationality.’” (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886))). 
 48.  E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). The Supreme Court has also 
recognized a compelling interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination. See, e.g., 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 450. Even though Texas has a well-documented history of de jure 
segregation, UT does not aver that it has a compelling interest in remedying the effects of past 
discrimination. But see Brief for Amici Curiae NAACP, et al. In Support of Respondents at 23, 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. Aug. 13, 2012) (arguing that UT has a 
compelling interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination in state-funded education). 
 49.  In Grutter, however, that path was considerably wider than is usually permitted under 
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Evan Gerstmann & Christopher Shortell, The Many Faces of Strict 
Scrutiny: How the Supreme Court Changes the Rules in Race Cases, 72. U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 38–39 
(2010) (arguing that “the scrutiny the Court applies to diversity-based affirmative action 
programs is quite different from the scrutiny it applies” in other race cases). 
 50.  438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 51.  Id. at 275. 
 52.  See id. at 318 (Powell, J., concurring) (invalidating the minority set-aside, but noting 
that “no such facial infirmity exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic background 
is simply one element—to be weighted fairly against other elements—in the selection process”). 
 53.  See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000); see 
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Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke established that universities may 
use race in order to attain a diverse student body.54 He reasoned that 
the “nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation 
of many peoples.”55 But Justice Powell was careful to note that racial 
diversity could not be pursued merely for its own sake: “It is not an 
interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of 
the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected 
ethnic groups.”56 The diversity Justice Powell envisioned focused 
instead on “a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of 
which race . . . is but a single though important element.”57 
C. Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger58 
In 2003, the Supreme Court’s twin decisions in Grutter and Gratz 
v. Bollinger59 reaffirmed that diversity in higher education is a 
compelling government interest.60 In Gratz, the undergraduate 
admissions policy at the University of Michigan assigned an automatic 
twenty points (out of 150 possible points) to minority applicants.61 The 
Court held that this policy was not narrowly tailored, because race 
was often the decisive factor in admission.62 The Court reiterated that 
race can be used only as one of many factors in a system “flexible 
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the 
particular qualifications of each applicant.”63 
In Grutter, a white applicant claimed that the University of 
Michigan Law School denied her application because race was a 
 
also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (endorsing Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke). 
 54.  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (Powell, J., concurring) (concluding that student body 
diversity “clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education”). 
 55.  Id. at 313 (citation omitted). 
 56.  Id. at 315. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  For excellent discussions of these two cases, see Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and 
Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 459 (2004); Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 362–81 (2003). 
 59.  539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 60.  Id. at 275; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). There is reason to believe, 
however, that the diversity rationale for affirmative action policies in education is on shaky 
ground. In Parents Involved, four Justices rejected the proposition that diversity is a compelling 
interest for state elementary and high schools. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 733 (2007). 
 61.  539 U.S. at 255, 275. 
 62.  See id. at 271–72 (finding that race was decisive “for virtually every minimally qualified 
underrepresented minority applicant” (citation omitted)). 
 63.  Id. at 271 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., concurring)). 
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dominant factor in admissions.64 The Court disagreed, finding that the 
law school’s use of race embodied the type of policy of which Justice 
Powell spoke so highly in Bakke and therefore was constitutionally 
permissible.65 The difference between Grutter and Gratz turned on the 
extent to which race was used in the context of a holistic review.66 
The law school’s race-conscious policy, which would later serve as 
a model for UT’s, required that admissions staff consider “the ways in 
which the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity of the Law 
School.”67 This factor was considered along with the applicant’s GPA 
and LSAT scores, personal statement, letters of recommendation, and 
various “soft factors.”68 Race was not the predominant factor in the 
admissions decision, but it was “an extremely strong factor.”69 The law 
school did not establish a numerical target for minority enrollment; 
rather, it pursued what it called a “critical mass” of minority 
students—defined as “a number that encourages underrepresented 
minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel 
isolated.”70 
Applying strict scrutiny,71 the Court first held that the law school 
had “a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.”72 
Because “universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional 
tradition,” the Court concluded that the law school was free “to make 
its own judgments as to . . . the selection of its student body,” absent a 
showing of bad faith.73 The Court went on to hold that the law school’s 
 
 64.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317. 
 65.  Id. at 333–40. 
 66.  Interestingly, seven Justices found no meaningful difference between the two 
admissions policies. Only Justices O’Connor and Breyer saw distinguishing characteristics. See 
Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT 221, 244 n.104 (2004); cf. 
Ian Ayres & Sidney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007) (arguing that the Gratz policy was actually more narrowly tailored 
than the policy in Grutter). 
 67.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315. 
 68. These soft factors included “the enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the 
undergraduate institution, the quality of the applicant’s essay, and the . . . difficulty of 
undergraduate course selection.” Id. 
 69.  Id. at 320. An expert witness for Grutter testified at trial that “applicants from 
[underrepresented] minority groups are given an extremely large allowance for admission.” Id. 
 70.  Id. at 318. Because the law school required high GPA and LSAT scores for admission, 
it claimed it could not reach critical mass without using race as a “plus factor.” See id. 
(discussing trial testimony by the law school’s Director of Admissions). 
 71.  Justice O’Connor was careful to point out that “[s]trict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory, 
but fatal in fact.’” Id. at 326 (emphasis added). 
 72.  Id. at 328. 
 73.  Id. at 329 (citations omitted). 
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policy was narrowly tailored. 
“[S]atisfied that its admissions program . . . [did] not operate as a 
quota,”74 the Court found that the law school did not define diversity 
“solely in terms of racial and ethnic status,” consistent with the broad 
view of diversity approved in Bakke.75 The Court also found that the 
law school’s policy endorsed a forward-looking concept of diversity, 
focused on the educational benefits flowing therefrom, as opposed to 
achieving racial balance.76 And the Court determined that the law 
school had given sufficient consideration to race-neutral alternatives 
before electing to use race.77 Having satisfied both prongs of strict 
scrutiny, the race-conscious admissions policy survived a somewhat 
watered-down version of strict scrutiny. 
D. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 178 
After Grutter and Gratz, the Court—in another five-to-four 
decision—struck down the use of race in two public school-choice 
programs on narrow tailoring grounds.79 Justice Kennedy concurred in 
the judgment, but thought the plurality was “too dismissive of the 
legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal 
opportunity regardless of race.”80 Although Grutter apparently was 
not controlling in Parents Involved,81 it became evident that at least 
four Justices would have no problem doing away with affirmative 
 
 74.  Id. at 335 (“Properly understood, a ‘quota’ is a program in which a certain fixed 
number or proportion of opportunities are ‘reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 75.  Id. at 316, 334–35. 
 76.  Id. at 330. 
 77.  See id. at 339–40 (recognizing that “[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of 
every conceivable race-neutral alternative” but only a “serious, good faith consideration of 
workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks” (citations 
omitted)). The Court also noted that there would be a substantial drop-off in minority 
enrollment—from fourteen percent of the student body to only four percent—if the law school 
could not consider race directly. See id. at 320. 
 78.  For more in-depth discussions of this case, see Maria Funk Miles, Confusing Means 
With Ends: How the Ninth Circuit Continues the Tradition of Mistaking Diversity As An Ends in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 1, 2005 B.Y.U. EDUC. & 
L.J. 245 (2005) (discussing the lower court opinions); Michelle Renee Shamblin, Silencing 
Chicken Little: Options for School Districts After Parents Involved, 69 LA. L. REV. 219 (2008). 
 79.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 726 (2007). For 
a good discussion of the relation between Parents Involved and affirmative action in higher 
education, see generally Andrew LeGrand, Narrowing the Tailoring: How Parents Involved 
Limits the Use of Race in Higher Education Admissions, 21 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 53 (2009). 
 80.  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 81.  Id. at 725 (majority opinion) (“The present cases are not governed by Grutter.”). 
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action in education.82 Thus, the future of race-conscious admissions at 
UT—and perhaps affirmative action in general—will likely rest with 
Justice Kennedy.83 
IV. HOLDING 
On January 18, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed84 a district court holding85 that UT’s use of race in 
admissions was constitutional.86 Like the district court, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that UT’s policy was essentially modeled on the 
one the Supreme Court approved in Grutter, and therefore must fall 
within that case’s rule.87 The more difficult question—addressed by 
both courts—was whether the Top Ten Percent Law, which has by 
itself a substantial effect on minority enrollment, renders UT’s 
 
 82.  See id. at 748 (plurality opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race 
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). 
 83.  See infra notes 137–141 and accompanying text (noting that, since Grutter, Justice 
Kennedy has replaced Justice O’Connor as the swing vote in affirmative action cases). See 
generally Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937 (2008) (discussing the 
importance of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved to the future of affirmative 
action in higher education); Kimberly A. Pacelli, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: 
Navigating the Narrows Between Grutter and Parents Involved, 63 ME. L. REV. 569 (2011) 
(discussing how Parents Involved might inform the Court’s application of Grutter to the present 
case). 
 84.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-3345). 
 85.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 613 (W.D. Tex. 2009), 
aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 86.  Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 247. (“[A]s long as Grutter remains good law, UT’s current 
admissions program remains constitutional.”). This case produced two concurring opinions. 
Judge King concurred fully in the judgment and in the Grutter analysis discussed above, but 
declined to join Judge Higginbotham’s discussion of the Top Ten Percent Law. Id. at 247 (King, 
J., concurring). Judge Higginbotham observed that the Top Ten Percent Law, although 
technically race-neutral, does not leave room for the use of race in the context of a holistic 
review and “is at best a blunt tool for securing the educational benefits that diversity is intended 
to achieve.” Id. at 238–42 (majority opinion). Because “[n]o party challenged . . . the validity or 
wisdom of the Top Ten Percent Law,” Judge King did not join that part of Judge 
Higginbotham’s opinion. Id. at 247 (King, J., concurring). Judge Garza, in a lengthy opinion, 
agreed that UT’s admissions policy was constitutional under Grutter, but wrote separately to 
advocate that Grutter itself was unconstitutional and should be overruled. Id. (Garza, J., 
concurring); see also Joshua Thompson, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: Could the 
Supreme Court Revisit Its Decision in Grutter?, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GRPS. 
57, 59–60 (2011) (summarizing Judge Garza’s concurrence). 
 87.  See Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (“[T]he Court has difficulty imagining an 
admissions policy that could more closely resemble the Michigan Law School’s admissions 
policy upheld . . . by the Supreme Court in Grutter.”); Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 243 (referring to 
UT’s policy as “a Grutter-style admissions system”). 
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explicit consideration of race constitutionally infirm.88 
The Fifth Circuit began by outlining the appropriate standard of 
review. Adhering to well-established precedent,89 the court subjected 
UT’s use of race to strict scrutiny.90 The court invoked Grutter for the 
proposition that educational institutions are entitled to “a degree of 
deference to [their] academic decisions,” such as whether and how to 
factor race into admission decisions.91 The court went on to determine 
that such deference applies not only to whether UT has a compelling 
interest in using race, but also to the means by which it chooses to 
pursue that interest.92 Armed with this especially deferential form of 
strict scrutiny, the court undertook an evaluation of UT’s race-
conscious admissions policy.93 
The court first concluded that UT’s policy, contrary to Fisher’s 
assertion, did not amount to racial balancing.94 The court found that 
UT was not using race simply to match student body demographics to 
those in the State of Texas, but rather in pursuit of the educational 
benefits of diversity.95 Although racial balancing cannot be the end 
goal of an admissions scheme, “[s]ome attention to numbers, without 
more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid 
quota.”96 It follows then that UT may consider Texas demographics—
but only to discern which minorities are underrepresented. Because 
UT did no more than that, its plan did not amount to unconstitutional 
racial balancing.97 
 
 88.  See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 243 (noting that the Top Ten Percent Law “places at risk 
UT’s race-conscious admissions policies”). 
 89.  See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 90.  Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 231 (“It is a given that as UT’s Grutter-like admissions program 
differentiates between applicants on the basis of race, it is subject to strict scrutiny . . . .”). 
 91.  Id. at 232. 
 92.  Id. (“That is, the narrow-tailoring inquiry—like the compelling-interest inquiry—is 
undertaken with a degree of deference to [UT’s] constitutionally protected, presumably expert 
academic judgment.”). 
 93.  See id. at 234 (applying strict scrutiny while “mindful of a university’s academic 
freedom and the complex educational judgments made when assembling a broadly diverse 
student body”). 
 94.  Id. at 238 (“[UT] adhered to Grutter when it reintroduced race into its admissions 
process based in part on an analysis that devoted special attention to those minorities which 
were significantly underrepresented on its campus.”). 
 95.  See id. at 236–37 (“UT properly concluded that these individuals from the state’s 
underrepresented minorities would be most likely to add unique perspectives that are otherwise 
absent from its classrooms.”). 
 96.  Id. at 235 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003)). 
 97.  See id. at 238 (“Although a university must eschew demographic targets, it need not be 
blind to significant racial disparities in its community, nor is it wholly prohibited from taking the 
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In deferring to “UT’s considered, good faith” judgment, the court 
next rejected Fisher’s contention that UT had already achieved a 
critical mass of minority students on campus when it adopted its 
current policy.98 Although UT had in fact achieved impressive levels 
of diversity prior to reintroducing race as a factor in admissions,99 the 
court found that “social changes” in Texas supported UT’s apparent 
conclusion that critical mass means something different today than it 
did then.100 Finding support in Grutter, the court went on to note that 
critical mass refers to diversity as opposed to mere numbers, making 
Fisher’s attempt to define critical mass in numerical terms 
unavailing.101 The court determined that seemingly adequate levels of 
minority enrollment might not reflect the “true level of diverse 
interaction” at UT and thus might be a poor proxy for critical mass.102 
Lastly, the court held that small gains in minority enrollment 
attributable to race-conscious policies did not themselves present 
constitutional problems, nor did they belie UT’s “good faith 
conclusion” that critical mass had not yet been achieved.103 
 
degree of disparity into account.”). 
 98.  Id. at 244 (citations omitted); see also id. at 242–43 (outlining Fisher’s arguments). Its 
ruling in favor of UT notwithstanding, the court was obviously concerned about the Top Ten 
Percent Law’s substantial effect on minority enrollment. See id. at 245 (noting that “UT’s claim 
that it has not yet achieved critical mass is less convincing when viewed against the backdrop of 
the Top Ten Percent Law”). Nevertheless, it recognized that the Top Ten Percent Law, standing 
alone, would not include the type of individualized review necessary to achieve a student body 
that is diverse, not only racially, but in myriad other ways. Consequently, the court reasoned 
that UT could supplement the Top Ten Percent Law by considering race directly. See id. at 239 
(citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340). 
 99.  See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 100.  See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 244 (“[W]hatever levels of minority enrollment sufficed more 
than a decade ago may no longer constitute critical mass today, given the social changes Texas 
has undergone during the intervening years.”). 
 101.  See id. (“Grutter pointedly refused to tie the concept of ‘critical mass’ to any fixed 
number. The Grutter Court approved of the . . . goal of attaining critical mass even though the 
school had specifically abjured any numerical target.” (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318)). 
 102.  See id. at 245 (discussing UT’s “appropriate consideration [of] whether aggregate 
minority enrollment is translating into adequate diversity in the classroom”). 
 103.  See id. at 246 (“The [Grutter] Court did not hold that a Grutter-like system would be 
impermissible even after race-neutral alternatives have been exhausted because the gains are 
small.”). Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (approving of race-conscious policies that produce small gains, 
so long as race is part of a “nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student 
characteristics”), with id. (“[T]he small number of assignments affected suggests that the schools 
could have achieved their stated ends through other means.”). 
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V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
Fisher’s overarching contention is that UT’s use of race in 
admission decisions violates the Equal Protection Clause.104 She first 
alleges that “[n]either of UT’s justifications for restoring race to its 
admission system is a constitutionally compelling state interest.”105 
Fisher contends that UT engages in constitutionally proscribed “racial 
balancing” by “using race in admissions to mirror the demographics of 
Texas.”106 UT’s goal (so the argument goes) is not racial diversity for 
the sake of educational benefits—the only interest recognized as 
compelling in Grutter—and therefore is constitutionally deficient.107 
Fisher goes on to argue that UT’s interest in achieving “classroom 
diversity” is outside the scope of Grutter’s recognized interest. Under 
Grutter, a university may seek to enroll a critical mass of minority 
students as a percentage of the total student body but not “major-by-
major and classroom-by-classroom.”108 
Moving to the second prong of strict scrutiny, Fisher contends that 
even if UT can articulate a compelling interest for using race, the 
means by which it seeks to achieve its goal of racial diversity is not 
narrowly tailored, for several reasons. First, UT’s race-conscious 
admissions policy is not narrowly tailored because it has too small of 
an impact on minority enrollment.109 
Second, “UT’s admissions system could never achieve ‘classroom 
diversity’ through constitutional means.”110 In order to diversify the 
classroom, UT would have to make race a dominant factor in either 
admissions or major selection, both of which would be clearly 
unconstitutional, given that race cannot be more than a minor factor 
considered in the context of a holistic review.111 
Third, “[e]ven if UT has a compelling interest in proportional 
representation based on Texas demographics . . . such a goal could not 
possibly be implemented in a narrowly tailored way.”112 To achieve 
 
 104.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 24. 
 105.  Id. at 19. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 19–20. 
 109.  Id. at 20–21. 
 110.  Id. at 21. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 45. 
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such racial balance would require implementing different targets for 
each minority group and such a practice would lead to more 
discrimination based on race—this time among the various minority 
groups.113 
Fisher next argues that the Fifth Circuit turned conventional strict 
scrutiny analysis on its head by showing too much deference to UT’s 
race-conscious policies. Under Grutter, a university is entitled to a 
degree of deference to its decision that it has a compelling interest in 
achieving racial diversity. But, as Fisher points out, “that is about as 
far as deference should go.”114 To defer to UT’s judgment that its race-
conscious system is narrowly tailored is to abandon the essence of 
strict scrutiny. 
Finally, Fisher proposes that the Court either clarify or overrule 
Grutter.115 In effect, Fisher argues that Grutter and strict scrutiny are 
incompatible, and, unless the Court elects to substantially revamp 
Grutter, one of them must go.116 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
UT begins by arguing that its race-conscious admissions policy 
“exemplifies the type of plan” that the Supreme Court approved in 
Grutter.117 Implicit in this argument is that if affirmative action in 
higher education is to survive as a matter of constitutional law, so 
must UT’s admissions policy. 
After pointing out that Fisher cannot “challenge the 
individualized nature of UT’s consideration of race,”118 UT attacks 
Fisher’s arguments for the admissions policy’s unconstitutionality. 
First, UT argues that its policy is not tantamount to “racial balancing,” 
because in the past the Court has found racial balancing only where 
the policy set a racial quota tied to demographics.119 Although Fisher 
contends that “mirror[ing] the demographics of Texas” is “UT’s 
acknowledged goal,”120 UT disagrees. It claims it has not established a 
racial quota, so its admissions policy cannot amount to racial 
 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 50. 
 115.  Id. at 53. 
 116.  Fisher refers multiple times to the Grutter standard as “unworkable.” See, e.g., id. at 
53–56. 
 117.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 19. 
 118.  Id. at 28. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 19. 
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balancing.121 Grutter does not foreclose UT’s ability to consider state 
demographics, so long as it does not work backward to achieve a 
racial target based on those demographics.122 
Second, that a substantial majority of applicants are admitted 
under the Top Ten Percent Law does not prohibit UT from 
considering race in the context of a “holistic review process.”123 
According to UT, the Top Ten Percent Law does not permit the type 
of individualized review necessary to achieve diversity within 
underrepresented minority groups and thus is not a race-neutral 
alternative that works “about as well.”124 UT concludes that to adopt 
Fisher’s position would preclude the very type of individualized 
review that the Court found so important in Bakke and Grutter. 
Third, UT attacks Fisher’s assertion that UT’s admissions system 
is not narrowly tailored because it has too small an effect on minority 
enrollment. As UT puts it, “the modest manner in which race may 
impact holistic admissions is a constitutional virtue, not a vice.”125 UT 
argues that it would be strange if its race-conscious plan could be 
unconstitutional because race was not given enough weight.126 UT 
further asserts that its nuanced consideration of race is important “to 
assembl[ing] a student body that is broadly diverse—including within 
different minority groups.”127 In other words, just because UT’s 
modest use of race does not account for a substantial increase in 
minority enrollment does not mean that it fails to account for a 
substantial increase in student body diversity. 
 
 
 121.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 28. UT does admit that it considers Texas 
demographics when determining which minorities are underrepresented, but points out that 
“some attention to numbers” does not “transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid 
quota.” Id. 
 122.  See id. at 29 (averring that UT does not engage in racial balancing because it has not 
established a “goal, target, or other quantitative objective” for minority admissions). 
 123.  See id. at 31–32 (“Indeed, in Grutter this Court specifically rejected the argument that 
percentage plans are a complete, workable, and constitutionally required alternative to the 
individualized consideration of race in holistic review.” (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 339–40 (2003))). 
 124.  See id. at 33–35 (“[For example], the [black] or Hispanic child of successful 
professionals in Dallas who has strong SAT scores and has demonstrated leadership ability in 
extracurricular activities but falls in the second decile of his or her high school class . . . cannot 
be admitted under the top 10% law.”). 
 125.  Id. at 36. 
 126.  See id. (pointing out the inherently flawed nature of Fisher’s assertion that “UT’s 
consideration of race in holistic admissions is too modest to pass muster”). 
 127.  Id. at 33. 
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Fourth, a paucity of classroom diversity is evidence that UT has 
not yet attained a critical mass. UT asserts that its “objective was the 
educational benefits of a richly diverse student body—the very 
interest held compelling in . . . Grutter.”128 Because diverse interactions 
leading to educational benefits mostly occur in the classroom, UT 
argues that it may focus on achieving more diversity in particular 
classes without running afoul of Grutter or the Constitution. 
Fifth, UT maintains that the Fifth Circuit did not abandon strict 
scrutiny in its review of UT’s admissions policy.129 UT agrees with 
Fisher that “[a] university does not get deference on the ultimate 
question whether the means through which it pursues its compelling 
interest are narrowly tailored,”130 but argues that the Fifth Circuit gave 
no such deference. 
UT ends with a brief discussion of reasons the Court should 
refrain from overruling Grutter, and observes that the doctrine of 
stare decisis counsels against overruling such an important decision, 
decided less than a decade ago.131 
VI. ANALYSIS 
Abigail Fisher’s challenge invites the Supreme Court to clean up 
its affirmative action jurisprudence by producing a more workable 
standard concerning when and how race can be used as a factor in 
university admissions. Before deciding the fate of UT’s policy, the 
Court will probably discuss whether diversity remains a compelling 
interest in higher education, the degree of deference universities 
should receive in the adoption and implementation of race-conscious 
polices, and the precise requirements of narrow tailoring. When the 
dust settles, a majority of the Court will probably have found a way to 
invalidate UT’s policy by substantially recalibrating the analysis in 
Grutter. Nevertheless, this case probably will not be the death of 
affirmative action, and Grutter (albeit with a different look) is likely 
to survive as binding precedent. But going forward, university 
affirmative action programs might have to find a way to withstand a 
 
 128.  See id. at 21 (highlighting the “stark racial isolation in [UT] classrooms”). 
 129.  Id. at 21, 47. 
 130.  Id. at 48. 
 131.  Id. at 51–53; cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) 
(noting that reexamination of precedent involves, inter alia, an inquiry into “whether facts have 
so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant 
application or justification”). 
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form of judicial review that is tantamount to “strict in theory, but fatal 
in fact.”132 
A. Revamping the Grutter Analysis 
1. Diversity as a Compelling Interest 
As a threshold matter, if UT’s policy is to have any chance of 
survival, the Supreme Court will have to reaffirm that diversity is a 
compelling interest that a university may pursue. Because there do 
not seem to be enough votes in support of the alternate view,133 the 
foundation of Grutter and Bakke probably will remain intact. The 
Court is likely, however, to cabin the compelling interest to the 
pursuit of student body diversity, as opposed to diversity in the 
classroom. To hold otherwise would permit a university to use race in 
admissions indefinitely—until “educators [can] certif[y] that the 
elusive critical mass ha[s] finally been attained, not merely in the 
student body generally, but major-by-major and classroom-by-
classroom.”134 
2. Deference and Strict Scrutiny 
Under Grutter’s deferential treatment of university decision-
making, establishing a compelling interest in diversity was practically 
a formality, and as evidenced by the Fifth Circuit decision, such 
deference has carried over to the narrow tailoring inquiry.135 This 
probably will not be true after Fisher. The Court will likely recast the 
deferential standard it adopted in Grutter by bringing both the 
compelling interest and narrow tailoring analyses closer in line with 
conventional strict scrutiny. Consequently, a university may no longer 
be afforded ample deference in determining whether it has reached a 
 
 132.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“[W]e wish to dispel 
the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” (citation omitted)). 
 133.  Assuming the “liberal” wing of the Court votes as expected, ending diversity’s tenure 
as a compelling government interest would require Justice Kennedy’s vote. Although Justice 
Kennedy has never voted to uphold an affirmative action policy, he has consistently endorsed 
the notion that a university’s interest in diversity can, in some instances, be compelling. See, e.g., 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783 (2007) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). There is no 
reason to think he will change his mind in this case. 
 134.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 631 F.3d 213, 254 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(Garza, J., concurring) (“Allowing race-based social engineering at the university level is one 
thing, but not nearly as invasive as condoning it at the classroom level.”), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
1536 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-3345). 
 135.  See id. at 232 (majority opinion). 
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critical mass of minority enrollment.136 In addition, the Court will 
likely make clear that whatever minimal deference applies to the 
compelling interest analysis does not apply to the narrow tailoring 
prong. 
Perhaps the most important difference between Grutter and 
Fisher is that Justice Kennedy now occupies Justice O’Connor’s 
former seat as the swing Justice in affirmative action cases. Justice 
O’Connor, in her majority opinion in Grutter, was content to defer to 
Michigan Law School on several fronts: whether it had enrolled a 
critical mass of minority students,137 whether it had appropriately 
considered race-neutral alternatives,138 and whether it “w[ould] 
terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as 
practicable.”139 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, dissented in 
Grutter precisely because he thought that the majority “refuse[d] to 
be faithful to the settled principle of strict review designed to reflect 
[important] concerns.”140 His vote could allow the Fisher Court to 
rewrite the deferential standard espoused in prior cases.141 
If such a revision does occur, the Court probably will start by 
embracing the idea that deference, even at the compelling interest 
stage, cannot coexist with strict scrutiny. This seems a simple 
proposition at first glance, but the Court will have to find a way 
around the fact that universities, for First Amendment reasons, must 
be afforded some level of deference in creating the type of student 
body that best fosters their educational objectives.142 This would 
 
 136.  Notably, several Justices at oral argument seemed hostile to the idea of critical mass, 
intimating that it is virtually indistinguishable from a quota. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 45, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012) 
(Roberts, C.J.) (“[Y]ou won’t tell me what the critical mass is. How am I supposed to do the job 
that our precedents say I should do?”). Although Grutter recognized the distinction, 539 U.S. at 
335–36, it is conceivable that the Court could scrap the critical mass concept in favor of a more 
useful analytical tool. Cf. Terrell, supra note 7, at 234 (criticizing critical mass). 
 137.  Grutter, 539 U.S at 329–30. 
 138.  Id. at 340, 343. 
 139.  Id. at 343. 
 140.  See id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Notably, Justice Kennedy seems to accept 
Grutter-level deference “to a university’s definition of its educational objective.” See id. 
However, because he is a strong proponent of rigorous judicial review when racial classifications 
are at issue, he will likely not object to a decision that removes some of the deferential gloss 
from the compelling interest analysis. 
 141.  Cf., Eric K. Yamamoto, Carly Minner & Karen Winter, Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49 
HOW. L.J. 241, 248 (2006) (discussing the “more flexible, contextualized version of strict 
scrutiny” embraced in Grutter). 
 142.  See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312–14 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (“The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes 
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require squaring deference to a university’s educational decisions 
with strict scrutiny review, which requires more than a good faith 
assurance that the explicit use of race is necessary.143 Under Grutter’s 
overly deferential standard, it is virtually impossible for courts to 
ensure that a university’s nebulous claim of insufficient diversity is 
not pretextual. After Fisher, by contrast, future courts probably will 
be forced to evaluate rigorously whether a university actually needs 
more diversity in order to attain the educational benefits that flow 
therefrom (as opposed to simply taking the university at its word), 
even before reaching the question of whether the particular policy at 
issue is narrowly tailored. 
3. Narrow Tailoring 
Any deference the Court is willing to grant UT at the compelling 
interest stage almost certainly will stop there. While Grutter said that 
“[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable 
race-neutral alternative,”144 the Fisher Court may hold that racial 
classifications can be employed only as “a last resort.”145 The last 
resort inquiry would entail a thorough examination of possible race-
neutral alternatives, require empirical evidence showing that race is 
not a dominant admissions factor, and look unfavorably upon race-
conscious policies that have only a small effect on minority 
enrollment. 
 
the selection of its student body.”). A burden-shifting analysis, like the following, could help 
balance these competing standards. A university’s assertion that it needs a more diverse student 
body (i.e., that it has not yet reached critical mass) would create a rebuttable presumption that it 
has established a compelling interest in pursuing that goal. An applicant-plaintiff could rebut 
that presumption with evidence showing that the university can achieve the educational benefits 
of diversity without using race as a factor in admissions. If the applicant-plaintiff succeeds, the 
burden would then fall on the university to identify specific educational goals it would achieve 
by increasing student body diversity through the use of racial preferences. Upon such a showing, 
a university will have established its compelling interest in creating a more diverse student body. 
All that would be left is an inquiry into whether the policy the university chose to adopt is 
narrowly tailored. 
 143.  See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989) (“The history of racial 
classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to . . . pronouncements of 
necessity has no place in equal protection analysis.”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 
49, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012) (Sotomayor, J.) 
(“[W]hen do we stop deferring to the University’s judgment that race is still necessary? That’s 
the bottom line of this case.”). 
 144.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. 
 145.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]ndividual racial classifications employed in this manner may be 
considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling interest.”). 
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After Fisher, narrow tailoring could require not only 
consideration, but attempted implementation of race-neutral 
alternatives. These alternatives may not be identical for each 
institution of higher education, depending on its educational mission; 
but virtually any university will need to have exhausted certain 
alternatives—like targeted scholarship programs, focused marketing 
campaigns, and using race-neutral criteria as proxies for race146—
before resorting to racial classifications. As part of this analysis, the 
Court will want to consider the administrative burden a university 
might be forced to shoulder in enacting race-neutral policies.147 Unlike 
Grutter, however, Fisher will likely mandate a showing that all 
practical race-neutral alternatives failed in attaining adequate 
diversity before permitting the resort to racial classifications. 
In response to Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter, the Court 
might also elect to be more skeptical when a university claims that 
race is only a minor factor in the admission decision. Justice Kennedy, 
in voting to invalidate Michigan Law School’s race-conscious policy, 
was concerned that the “Law School made no effort to guard against 
[the] danger” of race “becom[ing] divorced from individual review.”148 
He premised this conclusion on the law school’s insistence on tracking 
minority enrollment throughout the admissions cycle, which he 
thought made race a decisive factor in many admission decisions 
towards the end of the cycle.149 In order to guarantee that race never 
becomes too dominant a factor in admissions, the Court could 
conclude that tracking the racial composition of the incoming class, 
when paired with an admissions policy in which race is considered, is a 
per se violation of the narrow tailoring requirement. Under this 
standard, a university would have to show that it does not “keep 
ongoing tallies of racial or ethnic composition of [its] entering 
 
 146.  Cf. id. at 789 (suggesting other race-neutral means by which an educational institution 
“may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds”). 
 147.  Of course, universities would not be required to implement particularly burdensome 
race-neutral polices just to “try them out.” A graduate or professional school, for example, 
would probably not be required to enact a percentage plan, which may be a workable race-
neutral alternative only for an undergraduate state institution. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 
(indicating that the law school is not expected to adopt race-neutral alternatives that would 
effectively compromise its educational integrity and/or alter the inherent nature of the 
institution). 
 148.  Id. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 149.  See id. at 392–93 (expressing concern that the law school provided no safeguard against 
the admissions officers’ use of “the [daily] reports to recalibrate the plus factor given to race 
depending on how close they were to achieving the Law School’s goal of critical mass”). 
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students,”150 and it would be required to identify sufficient safeguards 
that protect against an applicant’s race being given too much 
weight.151 The practical upshot would be that university race-conscious 
admissions policies would have to be more transparent than was 
necessary under Grutter. 
Finally, the Court could further heighten the narrow tailoring 
standard by concluding that gains in minority enrollment resulting 
from race-conscious policies must be large enough to warrant the use 
of race—”a highly suspect tool.”152 Although this reasoning was 
implicit in Grutter, the Court did not expressly endorse a cost-benefit 
analysis in that decision. In Parents Involved, however, the Court 
hinted that this reasoning was legitimate.153 Fleshed out, the rationale 
would look like this: Because there is great inherent cost in treating 
persons differently based on their race, the benefits resulting from 
such disparate treatment must be at least equally great. How the 
Court will decide when the effect of race is neither too small nor too 
large is difficult to predict. It could find that narrow tailoring now 
requires that race (1) be used in the context of individualized review154 
and (2) effectuate more than a negligible increase in minority 
enrollment. Although the second requirement begs the initial 
question (by merely substituting one subjective determinate for 
another—“negligible” for “too small”), it comports with strict scrutiny 
by ensuring that race is being used only to the extent necessary to 
achieve meaningful increases in diversity, as opposed to being used 
 
 150.  Id. Tracking the racial composition of the incoming class creates a significant risk that, 
until critical mass is attained, race will be given increasingly greater weight as the end of the 
admissions cycle approaches. Requiring that universities wait until the end of the cycle to 
evaluate the racial makeup of the incoming class would allow courts to ensure that a university 
is not pursuing race-based numerical targets under the guise of a holistic review system. If 
admissions officers do not know how many minority applicants have been admitted, there would 
be no reason for the weight given to race to change as the cycle wanes. 
 151.  As a practical matter, this may require admissions data showing significant yearly 
fluctuation in minority enrollment that does not correlate directly with yearly fluctuation in the 
percentage of underrepresented minorities in the applicant pool. A consistent pattern of 
minority enrollment that falls within a tight range over a multiple-year span suggests that the 
university may be pursuing race-based numerical targets. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 384–85 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 152.  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
 153.  The Court suggested that the “minimal impact” of racial classifications could “cast 
doubt on [their] necessity,” and noted that “[i]n Grutter, the consideration of race was viewed as 
indispensible in more than tripling minority representation.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 734–35 (2007). 
 154.  See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text (highlighting the importance of the 
individualized review requirement). 
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for some other, more insidious reason. 
In short, after Fisher, a university that wants to factor race into 
admissions will probably have to (1) present tangible evidence that it 
had not reached a critical mass prior to implementing a race-
conscious policy; (2) show that it tried every practical race-neutral 
alternative before resorting to racial classifications; (3) prevent 
admissions staff from ever knowing the racial composition of the class 
prior to the end of the admissions cycle; (4) ensure that race is given 
just the right amount of weight; and (5) guarantee that its race-
conscious policy will continue only for as long as is absolutely 
necessary.155 
B. Application to UT’s Admissions Policy 
Armed with a considerably less-deferential standard of review, the 
Court probably will invalidate UT’s use of race in admissions on 
narrow tailoring grounds. Although the Court might not be willing to 
defer completely to UT’s assertion that it cannot achieve all the 
educational benefits of diversity at current diversity levels, it will 
likely be satisfied that UT has done enough to establish a compelling 
interest in pursuing diversity. The Court could rely, for example, on 
two studies UT commissioned in 2003, both of which showed that 
contemporaneous diversity levels were insufficient.156 That would 
seem to be enough to pass constitutional muster, even under a less-
deferential standard. The decision is well within UT’s “expert 
academic judgment”157 and moreover is supported with tangible 
evidence. By pointing to the two studies, the Court can say it is 
applying strict scrutiny while still acknowledging that universities 
receive special treatment under the First Amendment. Because UT’s 
policy probably will not survive the narrow tailoring inquiry, it will not 
be necessary for the Court to spend much time here. 
The Court could decide that UT’s policy is not narrowly tailored 
for several reasons. It could hold, for example, that UT has not met its 
burden of showing that it tried all practical race-neutral alternatives 
 
 155.  The Grutter Court made clear that race-concious admissions policies, in order to be 
constitutional, must include “sunset provisions.” See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“[A]ll 
governmental use of race must have a logical end point.”). 
 156.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 631 F.3d 213, 225 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that the study found that ninety percent of these smaller classes had either one or zero 
black students), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-3345). 
 157.  Id. at 232. 
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before adopting its current race-conscious policy. By trotting out a 
laundry list of suggestions, the Court could simply say, “try these first.” 
The Court could hold that the Top Ten Percent Law yields sufficient 
numbers of minority students each year and therefore precludes UT 
from experimenting with race-conscious policies. The Court could 
hold that UT must, at the very least, be able to show the precise effect 
of its use of race on enrollment numbers, and that its failure in this 
regard is detrimental to the claim that its policy is narrowly tailored.158 
These possibilities notwithstanding, the Court is likely to focus on the 
fact that UT’s race-conscious admissions policy has produced only a 
small increase in minority enrollment. 
As discussed above, the Court will likely emphasize that narrow 
tailoring is “about balancing constitutional costs and benefits.”159 UT’s 
use of race may only be a small factor in a system that epitomizes 
individualized review, but race still has to make more than a negligible 
difference in minority enrollment, given the inherent cost associated 
with race-based preferences. UT’s pre-Grutter admissions policy 
produced a class that was 21.4% black and Hispanic.160 It is true that 
minority enrollment had reached 25.5%161 by the time Abigail Fisher 
applied, but all of that increase cannot definitively be attributed to the 
explicit use of race.162 Judge Garza estimated that, in the year Fisher 
applied, the number of minority applicants admitted because of race 
was probably not more than one percent of the incoming class.163 
Consequently, the Court could conclude that UT’s use of race does 
not contribute to any meaningful educational benefits that cannot be 
achieved at current diversity levels, and therefore fails the narrow 
tailoring test. 
In Grutter, the law school’s use of race boosted minority 
enrollment from four percent to fourteen percent.164 Race was used in 
the context of a holistic review, and the increases wrought in minority 
enrollment contributed in a significant way to diverse interaction on 
 
 158.  See id. at 252–53 (Garza, J., concurring) (“[W]ithout the ability to measure the number 
of ‘but-for’ admits . . . , courts cannot meaningfully evaluate whether a university’s use of race 
fits its asserted interest narrowly.” (citations omitted)). 
 159.  Id. at 263. 
 160.  Id. at 224 (majority opinion). 
 161.  Id. at 226. 
 162.  See id. (“Because of the myriad programs instituted, it can be difficult to attribute 
increases in minority enrollment to any one initiative.”). 
 163.  See id. at 259–62 (Garza, J., concurring) (discussing UT admissions data supporting 
that estimation). 
 164.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003). 
RASH FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2012  12:23 AM 
2012] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON LIFE SUPPORT 49 
campus. It seems that UT, by contrast, cannot credibly argue that 
enrolling approximately 200 more minority students (assuming, 
unrealistically, that race was the “but for” cause of admission for all of 
these applicants) in a class of over 6,000 is tied to any discernible 
educational benefit. And even if it could, there is no reason to think 
the same small increase in racial diversity could not be achieved 
through race-neutral means. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
What specific educational benefits of diversity does the student 
body lack? How does the increase in minority enrollment resulting 
from a race-conscious admissions policy produce such benefits? And 
why could those benefits not be achieved through race-neutral 
means? In asking these (or similar) questions, the Court could recast 
Grutter by requiring a closer fit, not just between diversity and the 
means by which it is pursued, but between diversity and its purported 
educational benefits. Since Bakke, it has been axiomatic that racial 
diversity cannot be pursued for its own sake; it must be tied to the 
academic good that justifies racial classifications in higher 
education.165 The Court will probably hold that UT’s race-conscious 
system conflicts with this principle and therefore violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
In deciding Fisher, the Court likely will put to rest, at least for 
now, doubts surrounding the constitutional legitimacy of affirmative 
action. But after Fisher, the explicit use of race in university 
admissions, like abortion after Casey, may be subject to a new, more 
stringent set of rules. 
 
 
 165.  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). 
